~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

Washington, D. C.

ExCom-M-26

NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting Held July 15, 1971
Office of Deputy Secretary of Defense
Room 3E 928, The Pentagon
2:05 - 4:50 p.m.

Members Present

Mr. David Packard	Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Richard Helms	Director of Central Intelligence
Dr. Edward E. David, Jr.	Science Advisor to the President

Others Present

Dr. John L. McLucas	Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Ex Officio
Dr. F. Robert Naka	Secretary, NRP Executive Committee and Deputy Director, NRO Ex Officio
Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett	Director, DIA
Vice Adm. Harold G. Bowen, Jr.	DASD/I
Dr. Louis Tordella	Deputy Director, NSA
Dr. James R. Schlesinger	Assistant Director, OMB
Mr. Carl E. Duckett	DDS&T/CIA
Dr. John J. Martin	Office of Pres. Sci. Advisor
Dr. Robert Hermann	NSA
[redacted]	NRO Comptroller
Dr. Charles A. Sorrels	OMB

(Present for ZAMAN and [redacted] Briefings Only)

Col. David D. Bradburn	Director, NRO Staff
Col. Frank W. Hartley, Jr.*	Director, Program D
Col. William R. Bell*	Program D Office
Lt. Col. Frederick L. Hofmann	NRO Staff
[redacted]	[redacted] FTD/AFSC

*Also present for TAGBOARD briefing

EARPOP GAMBIT CORONA HEXAGON [redacted] TAGBOARD IDEALIST

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

CONTROL NO BYE-12983-71

WORKING COPY

Others Present (Cont.)

(Present for Multimission Briefing Only)

[redacted] NRO Staff
NRO Staff

Dr. McLucas suggested that the meeting begin with a couple of informational briefings even though Dr. David had not yet arrived.

EOI Informational Briefing

Mr. Duckett presented the recent photographic results obtained by flying a Westinghouse 768 element array in an A-3D aircraft. Photographs with various GSDs and integration times were displayed. These were compared with a single GAMBIT photograph. The EOI photographs displayed a larger dynamic range. Dr. Naka pointed out the sensor had a sensitivity wider than [redacted] (A summary of the briefing is on file in the NRO.) Dr. David arrived as the briefing ended.

[redacted] Informational Briefing

Dr. McLucas next introduced a film presenting the [redacted]

[redacted]

TAGBOARD

Issue

Should the TAGBOARD drone reliability be improved in accordance with the review committee's recommendations.

Discussion

Dr. McLucas opened the formal portion of the ExCom meeting with a discussion of the TAGBOARD drone program. He said that, following the last TAGBOARD mission failure, he had appointed a group to review the program to improve the drone's reliability.

Colonel Hartley, Director of Program D, presented the results of the committee's findings. (The briefing is on file in the NRO.) Briefly, the major findings were that

1. The production process of TAGBOARD should resemble that of a satellite rather than a manned aircraft since it is subjected to launch loads and mission environments similar to a satellite. Further, there is no pilot aboard to make up for equipment failure.

2. The factory-to-pad launch concept which has been successful for satellites should be employed.

Recommendations were made to implement the findings. A small manpower increase in the SPO and a cut of 40 percent in the operational squadron were to be made to implement the recommendations. A change in the contractors' team is also planned.

Dr. Naka continued the discussion by saying that he was asked to comment about the requirements for TAGBOARD. The principal values of TAGBOARD are that it is unmanned and that it has an opportunity to wait for cloud cover to break. The particular areas where cloud cover inhibits satellite photography are South China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Eastern Europe. In the present state of gaps in satellite coverage--that is, we don't have daily coverage--the Middle East might also be considered an area where we need drone coverage. Dr. Naka made statements about the response time available. GAMBIT and CORONA have a response time, assuming they are not up, of about 25 days. The HEXAGON time is not yet known. The SR-71 has a 56-hour world-wide deployment capability: 24 hours from the operating location. The U-2 is 50 hours world-wide, 24 hours from operating location. TAGBOARD is five days world-wide, 24 hours on extended hold. So for 24-hour response, we have the SR-71, U-2, and TAGBOARD. The advantage of TAGBOARD, then, is that it is unmanned and has 24-hour alert capability. Further discussion of requirements was omitted, including the statement of the number of crises, duration, etc., which were the results of a recent COMIREX study.

In his presentation of the cost data, [redacted] showed the decision from the November ExCom meeting for the

FYDP. This was based on putting TAGBOARD in flyable storage for FY 1972; maintaining through FY 1973; and, if not launched by then, going into dead storage in FY 1974. Option 1 is for flying nine of the 17 remaining drones. Two of the 17 involve difficulty in refurbishment, and at a higher cost, so that from a practical standpoint only 15 could be refurbished. The drone availability is from February to September next year. It was stated in the briefing that we could be flying in March or April of 1972. Option 1 is a highly compressed schedule, so the bulk of the refurbishment costs show up in FY 1972 and the remainder in FY 1973 with operating costs accounting for the balance. After flying nine, the six remaining would be put in dead storage. Option 1A still provides nine flights but stretches out the refurbishment schedules so that three per year would be delivered. This has a slight advantage for the 1972 costs but it does cost, over the program, $3M more. It starts out, however, with the March or April 1972 first flight; and it does not have the shelf-life problems before launch that Option 1 would. In other words, all the refurbishments are finished on the vehicles by September 1972 in Option 1; but, if launch were delayed until late FY 1974, there could be up to a year and a half of shelf-life problems before launch. Thus, Option 1A, from the standpoint of refurbishment timing before flight, makes more sense. Option 2 is on the basis of refurbishing 15 of the 17, again with the compressed refurbishment schedule. Option 2 is quite a bit more expensive than Option 1 or 1A. Option 1 is $30.6M total; Option 1A is $33.6M; Option 2 is $54.9M. The 1972 figures cause a problem. $2.6M was budgeted. TAGBOARD and the U-2 are funded under the Aircraft Procurement appropriation so there is not the flexibility which there is on satellite programs. As a result, we must account for the difference between these figures either by a budget amendment before the appropriation is made or have Air Force reprogramming (and, of course, reprogramming has a bad name). Thus, for Option 1, 1A, or 2 we need to ask for an increase in the FY 1972 budget.

Options 3A, 3B, and 3C were developed to avoid the FY 1972 budget problem and involve holding for a year, then going to the nine or the 15 refurbishment program or to dead storage. Option 4 provides for dead storage now. Option 4 at $.6M in FY 1972 covers one-time costs and, beyond that, the cost is about $30,000 a year.

In response to Mr. Packard's question as to the cost of an SR-71 mission, Dr. McLucas said that, at the rate

of eight or nine per year, one must cost $100,000. Mr. Packard then asked how many SR-71s are currently being maintained. [redacted] stated that we are scheduled to drop down soon to 12. We have considerably more than that in the inventory (at one time we had 27 total including two trainers, or 25 operational, but there have been one or two losses since). In response to Mr. Packard's question of the cost to operate 12 SR-71s, [redacted] said the total cost for a year, including contractor support, spares, maintenance, etc., is in the neighborhood of $80M. It was slightly over $100M to operate 16.

Mr. Packard asked how many U-2s are now operational, to which [redacted] stated that we have 11 U-2Rs and some C/Gs in addition. National costs for the 11 U-2Rs show estimates in the neighborhood of $30M for each of these five options.

Mr. Helms said he wanted to be certain he understood the correct view--that $17M takes care of all the work needed to change the TAGBOARD from an aircraft to something on the fashion of a satellite. [redacted] responded that that was correct--under Option 1 the refurbishment cost itself is $17M. In Option 2 it is $28M. The rest are operating costs. Under Option 1A, $20M is for refurbishment. Thus it works out to about $2M each for refurbishment. Option 1A spreads refurbishment over three years and has the advantage of avoiding the shelf-life problem. He emphasized that with Option 1 or 1A the nine TAGBOARD number is essentially related to the Film Readout GAMBIT availability, whereas Option 2 is related to the EOI availability from a crisis response standpoint. [redacted] added that if the ExCom decided to proceed with refurbishment the first TAGBOARD could fly in March or April 1972. Mr. Helms stated that, as a practical matter, although we are using the SR-71 over North Korea now, we are really talking about its use over China or the Soviet Union and that he felt we would not actually use it over Russia. Asked the range of TAGBOARD, Colonel Hartley said it is about 3500 miles on a straight course and on a typical mission our experience has been about 3100 miles. He added that its speed is 3.3 mach with an initial cruise at 83,000 feet.

Mr. Helms raised the question of where we would get the money for a TAGBOARD refurbishment since this amount (approximately $15M) was not foreseen during NRO budget discussions. [redacted] said that, because of the appropriation

account involved, the NRP could not supply the money. A small amount could be picked up from prior year unobligated funds but this is inadequate and we should attempt to have Congress make this a budget amendment before there is an appropriation.

Mr. Packard observed that, assuming funding could be found, it was really a question of spending $30M or $54M to provide a capability for three or five years, respectively. Asked by Mr. Helms for his recommendation, Dr. McLucas replied that if the ExCom really wants the TAGBOARD capability then Option 1 or 2 should be chosen. However, his personal feeling (not taking into account possible Department of State feelings on overflight) was that, with U-2 and SR-71 capabilities, there was no situation where one would need to use TAGBOARD. Mr. Packard added that the KH-9 is also giving us a great deal of information. Elaborating on his earlier statement of the value of the TAGBOARD capability, Dr. McLucas stated the opposing argument: This is the earliest unmanned system with crisis capability and is less provocative than the U-2 or the SR-71. Mr. Helms commented that, although the State Department has considered TAGBOARD a most attractive capability because it is unmanned, the world atmosphere has changed so that, politically, even an unmanned vehicle can be used in very few places. Mr. Packard alluded to a study on North Korea which indicated that ELINT is more useful for crisis evaluation than photography. He continued that Program D had done a good job of providing various interesting options but that in view of cost versus usefulness he felt the ExCom should choose Option 4, dead storage.

Decision

The ExCom voted to accept Option 4, dead storage, for the TAGBOARD drone program.

U-2

Discussion

As for the U-2, Dr. McLucas wondered whether we needed to discuss it today. He referred to the conversations between Mr. Packard and Mr. Helms a couple of days earlier which he felt could reflect on the decision. Nevertheless, Dr. McLucas felt the proper option was for the split fleet since the costs of the various options were now nearly the same. That would permit Dr. McLucas to arrange the distribution of aircraft between fleets to maximize the operations.

ExCom-M-26

Mr. Helms presented a signed memorandum to Mr. Packard stating that CIA/OSA would propose to accept the responsibility for Cuba overflights, releasing a SAC aircraft for its COMINT mission. If that were unacceptable, OSA would lend a U-2R to SAC. Mr. Packard said the whole point of the fleet adjustment was to prove the value of COMINT collection by U-2.

Decision

The ExCom voted to accept Option 1, the split U-2R fleet.

Approved for Release: 2021/04/08 C05121809

Approved for Release: 2021/04/08 C05121809

Approved for Release: 2021/04/08 C05121809

Approved for Release: 2021/04/08 C05121809

ExCom-M-26

EOI

Issue

The issues concerning EOI, FROG, and GAMBIT could not be resolved at this meeting because it had been decided earlier to refer the matter to the President.

Discussion

Mr. Packard focused attention on EOI, FROG, and GAMBIT.

[redacted] stated that Option 1 was for a January 1976 first launch objective, but with restraints in the NRP funding in 1972 and 1973 as directed by the DNRO. Also, the Data Relay Satellite was adjusted to the January 1976 launch time with funding shown although it is outside the NRP. We have a problem with the DRS because tentative funding has been fluctuating wildly. Mr. Packard inquired whether the DRS could be funded within the NRP. Dr. McLucas replied that it could, but we felt there were various reasons why we would like to handle it outside. One is that the Air Force would like to do it. Another is that it can be a multimission satellite. Further, we do not want to drive up the NRP budget.

[redacted] continued that Option 2 is a June 1976 first launch budget. There is very little difference between it and Option 1 except in FY76. The reason is that Option 2 takes the same time for development and acquisition as Option 1; but, in FY 1976, five months are taken for testing and for checkout. Dr. McLucas added that we had asked the CIA to develop figures based on first launch in January 1976 and in June 1976. The CIA replied that the best way to conduct either of these programs is to prepare to launch in January. If launch did not occur until June, there would be more time to test; but it would be unwise to wait five months and then start the program. The five months should be used during the test phase.

The Information Option presented was a result of the discussions with Senator Ellender. For this, we moved the first launch of EOI back to June 1975 on the assumption that we drop FROG.

Mr. Packard asked whether the total costs for these options were available. [redacted] replied they were--that

ExCom-M-26

[redacted]

In response to Dr. Schlesinger's question of the type of cost growth included, [redacted] said OSD economic escalation is included in all these. Mr. Packard noted that we do not have the normal costs shown. He asked what escalation was expected and [redacted] said on EOI the factors were based on 3.6 percent per year cumulated.

Mr. Packard inquired what experience we had on HEXAGON. What were the original HEXAGON estimates and what was the final cost? Dr. Sorrels replied that the original estimate was $125M per year for five launches. A main problem was with the camera where we had over a 200 percent overrun. [redacted] added that we now have $69M each for four a year. Mr. Packard noted that means $280M instead of $125M to fly one less bird. Dr. Naka interjected that the ground rules have changed. The bird is different from the one originally proposed. Various people added changes. [redacted] pointed out that Dr. Naka was correct; the original estimate was based on a vehicle with two buckets, not four; and it was based on a smaller vehicle, requiring a smaller booster, etc.

Dr. David also asked about the original time estimates to first launch. [redacted] replied the original first launch date was 1969.

Mr. Duckett pointed out that in the case of HEXAGON, the big difference was that we had spent little money and knew very little what we were trying to do. In the case of EOI, by the end of November, we will have put [redacted] into the program. He felt we know more about this program at a comparable time. Mr. Packard said he did not quite agree with that. He thought we had made good progress but EOI was a complicated job.

As to programs during tight budgets, one program that takes [redacted] a year is in itself going to jeopardize the likelihood of its being allowed. He felt we should worry about the cost. Dr. McLucas pointed out that the last option says that, before FROG, we were talking about a 1975 launch date and now we are saying it is not ruled out. Mr. Packard thought we ought to go to EOI but forget about a launch in 1975; we ought to say the best we can hope for is 1976 and we cannot be sure of that. He said he did not think we could tell the President he can have EOI before

1976. If we are lucky, if everything goes together well, we might meet the schedule; but he did not think we ought to program on that basis, we should be on a more conservative basis.

Mr. Packard inquired whether we had looked at any options under a [redacted] total annual figure. For example, had we considered an arbitrary ceiling of not over [redacted] Dr. McLucas said this program is what the managers feel is optimum. We have not gone to the program managers for a budget-limited program. Mr. Packard felt we should avoid the problem of requiring a budget of [redacted] in 1974. Mr. Helms replied that he shared Mr. Packard's concern. Dr. Schlesinger stated that, if we have an overrun and we put a [redacted] ceiling on the budget, it will delay the first launch. Mr. Packard said he understood that and that was why we should not promise the first launch at any precise date at this time, it's going to be 1976 or later. The ceiling makes no difference in 1972 or 1973.

Further, Mr. Packard felt that, for present purposes, we should be talking to the President about four or five options. Perhaps all we need do is agree that these estimates are acceptable and present other options as well. Dr. David wondered what we would say about the effect the ceiling would have. Would we bring that up at all? Mr. Packard felt we should present Option 2 since it is a little more conservative. He did not want to accelerate the program as in Options 1 and 3, that was asking for trouble. He could not see what the difference was between a 1975 and 1976 first launch.

Dr. David asked if we could not ask for Option 4 where we set an arbitrary ceiling, saying [redacted] had been mentioned. Mr. Packard inquired if it would take a little time to work that out; were these figures not worked out fairly carefully? Mr. Duckett replied that these figures are based on detailed studies. However, [redacted] said we can work up new ones in a matter of not over a couple of weeks. A problem is that we are still in the system definition phase and one of the things being worked on is what it costs to develop and to launch the satellite.

Mr. Packard felt we should agree to use the Option 2 figures, then point out the uncertainty and the difficulties. We should present a single program of [redacted] in FY 1974 and say that if we decide to keep the program under a [redacted] ceiling it is going to stretch out the time by several years and increase

the costs by some factor. [redacted] noted that we thought of that kind of approach last July. At that time we did set arbitrary limits for a couple of years. We asked with those limits what happens to the first launch date. Depending on the assumptions, we get different results. At that time the launch was pegged at June 1975 or April 1975. When the evaluation was completed, even with the arbitrary rule of limits, they came to the conclusion that they could still meet the first launch date. Mr. Packard felt that either of the Option 2 figures (as presented or with ceiling) are not what we should go on, knowing there is some uncertainty. Dr. David agreed based on our knowledge of the budgetary situation regardless of the Administration we have for FY 1974.

Mr. Packard felt he would like to see, in the draft letter being discussed, a separation of the development and acquisition costs from operating costs. [redacted] said he had those costs available by type of account.

FROG (and EOI)

Discussion

[redacted] continued on FROG contractor estimates as of July 3. In total, there is some increase over the April figures, about $24M over the period. At the April ExCom, we had $120M for FY 1972 and it came out $127.6M. The bulk of the increase appeared in FY 1973 where we had about $130.2M for FY 1973 before and now have $152.5M. Option 1 is on the basis of this being an interim system until EOI is available in FY 1976 so FROG is stopped in FY 1977. The launch pattern would be two in FY 1974, three in FY 1975, three in FY 1976, and two available for launch in FY 1977. If the EOI first launch is in June 1976, for instance, there would be two overlap vehicles. In reply to Dr. David's question on first launch, [redacted] replied it was keyed to 30 months from go-ahead or January 1974. Since we have slipped a month, perhaps we should say February 1974 now. Option 2 continues FROG beyond FY 1977 so it does not make any difference to the 1972 through 1975 budget.

After a general discussion on the significance of the budgetary figures presented, [redacted] stated that the program called for $177M for development and $41M each for the vehicles in orbit. Mr. Packard felt there were more costs, such as the ground stations. [redacted] replied that the existing satellite control facilities network would be used for FROG. Mr. Packard asked that figures be provided

for development and operating costs, including those for the ground stations. Dr. McLucas said we can obtain a breakdown on all the figures.

Mr. Packard replied that that was satisfactory because we were not going to make a decision today since it would be left for higher authority. We want to forward costs to Dr. David for Option 2 for EOI and for some option for FROG. Dr. David felt that was not reasonable; we must pick Option 2 for EOI and assume we do one of these or the other. Mr. Packard agreed. Dr. David said: "So, it's Option 2 in both cases." He continued that we could stick with our original program and, facing up to these numbers, felt we were at the place where we do one or the other. Mr. Helms felt we were forced in that direction even if we had to make the decision right here. Otherwise, he could not see how we could have an NRP under [redacted] Mr. Packard felt we could go with either program on the basis that it would be a continuing program. Dr. David felt this took one option out of his options paper prepared by Dr. Martin and wondered if the ExCom wanted to leave that out completely. Mr. Packard changed his view, saying he could not recommend having only these two options, rather he thought we should put them all in the letter. He felt we should provide data on these options which would then show what the budget problem is.

Dr. McLucas pointed out that there is another option which he felt would have looked good to Senator Ellender. It is to start FROG in July 1971 and to start the EOI two years later than now programmed. In other words, if we do not show simultaneous development of FROG and EOI programs, when we arrive at FY 1975 and FY 1976, we have only procurement costs for FROG. There would be a debate about whether you can phase out GAMBIT and buy only FROG--but that would be a procurement issue and not an R&D issue. Had we not said we were going to develop two systems simultaneously, we would not have raised our present predicament. Dr. Schlesinger asked if the first launch of EOI would then be in 1978. Dr. McLucas replied: "Yes." Mr. Helms felt we should not try to balance this ball like the Harlem Globe Trotters. We should lay out all the options, try to obtain a decision, and then fight for it. Dr. David said it is not acceptable to him to say that, if FROG is selected, EOI is going to drop in the drink and that's the last we will ever hear of it. He did not believe we would ever get back to EOI so he would not support that option. Mr. Packard felt the reason we were having these options in the letter was to make sure all this was clear.

Dr. David replied he thought Dr. McLucas was saying that, if the option were for FROG to go on some date, then EOI ought to be phased in, say in 1978, so that we would not have to develop both simultaneously.

Mr. Packard said this was all precipitated by the OMB letter involving Dr. Schlesinger that the President wanted a system by a certain time. He asked Dr. Schlesinger for comments and Dr. Schlesinger replied that he was very much attracted to the option that Dr. McLucas has of going with FROG now and, then, for a couple of years, explain to Congress that EOI is a technology program. Mr. Packard noted that if we set the EOI program back we could be talking about a [redacted] level of activity continuing for a couple of years on technology. Mr. Duckett felt that [redacted] was too high for technology only. However, the whole program would require review and adjustment.

Mr. Packard was concerned about whether the Data Relay Satellite (DRS) is inside or outside the NRP. Dr. McLucas replied that the Air Force is developing a DCP now as a SIOP communications area which overlaps the NRP to a great extent. If DRS goes, they will want a ride on it; but, if it does not go, then it will be the other way around.

Mr. Packard said if the EOI program is started in 1978 instead of 1976, it will slide all the major funding for DRS out two years but some money would be needed in the interim. The lowest we can get is probably [redacted] then it would rise to a normal level. Dr. David inquired why EOI would not be [redacted] or zero. [redacted] said that [redacted] was given as a technology figure when we talked about a program slip. Mr. Packard said we should carry on with those sensors and we should develop the technology (traveling wave tube) for the Data Relay Satellite. We should pick up key elements in the systems and carry those on. Dr. David felt it is unwise to abandon this technology. He asked [redacted] to help Dr. Martin with these figures. It would be best to escalate the decision.

Mr. Packard inquired whether there were any decision points now for these programs. [redacted] said Phase 2 of EOI would end in the fall. The FROG people have not started. We are marking time with them and it costs [redacted] a week to maintain the people. Mr. Packard said we should sustain the effort.

[redacted] stated that the NRO Staff is scheduled to appear before Mr. Mahon next week. We have not been before

Mr. Mahon for two years. We were with Mr. Ellender and with Mr. Stennis but not Mr. Mahon. Mr. Packard said he would like to go along to discuss this whole program. (The meeting was subsequently postponed.)

GAMBIT

Discussion

[redacted] continued with the GAMBIT budget. Option 1, tied to the FROG schedule on the basis that it can reduce GAMBIT launches, maintains four a year through FY 74, then drops to three in FY 75 and to two in FY 76 and FY 77. Option 2 maintains four GAMBITs a year as presently scheduled. Option 3 is four a year through FY 76 and then three in FY 77 when we tie into the EOI schedule. [redacted] noted that, because of lead time in procurement, the reduction in launches could be noticed (fundwise) as much as three years earlier.

Dr. McLucas said we have a quarterly target requirement on GAMBIT now. Mr. Packard said that posed a question for Mr. Helms, i.e., USIB. We ought to evaluate the requirements and see if we cannot back down on that quarterly requirement. Dr. McLucas noted that as a matter of fact we should have credit for GAMBIT's covering HEXAGON targets and vice versa. Mr. Packard felt that on the basis of the requirement we want to reevaluate GAMBIT frequency as soon as we can. We should stay with Option 1 for the time being. Dr. Schlesinger asked the impact of going to two in 1976 and 1977, given that this is our most valuable asset. Mr. Packard felt we should review that next year. Dr. Schlesinger felt that Option 1 was risky because the President might choose EOI alone and we would be counting on GAMBITs. Mr. Packard wanted flexibility if it were possible. Dr. McLucas felt that would be better, especially since we have not completed the study on HEXAGON and GAMBIT trade-offs. [redacted] pointed out that the out years are important because of the FYDP and recommended Option 3 for EOI. Mr. Packard agreed, unless FROG were voted, in which case it should be Option 1. Mr. Helms and Dr. David concurred.

Decision

The ExCom voted to accept Option 3. If it is decided to pursue FROG, Option 1 is selected.

ExCom-M-26

Total NRP Costs and Reduction Options

Discussion

Although the decision to ask the President for his guidance left the total budget in some doubt, [redacted] quickly ran through the material which he had available. Mr. Packard stated that when the Readout issue was settled it would set the NRP amounts for FY 1972 through 1977 subject to review in November 1971. The ExCom did not accept any of the other reduction potentials, such as terminating certain SIGINT programs.

Multimission Study

Discussion

Dr. McLucas introduced the subject of the Multimission Study. He said that we had formed an analysis group about a year ago and that a number of studies were being completed. As an example of one of these, Dr. McLucas had asked [redacted] who heads the analysis group to present the results of the study for collecting signals. He felt no action was required at this time but the results of the study would be relevant.

[redacted] presented a summary of a newly completed NRO study of the performance and costs of several different configurations of satellite systems for SIGINT overhead operations. These configurations included geo-synchronous orbit and high-altitude elliptical orbit satellites exclusively or in combination and a medium-altitude elliptical orbit option together with suitable low-altitude P-11 type vehicles as required. The conclusions indicated that within the ground rules of the study, certain configurations are preferred from the standpoint of performance and cost. [redacted] remarks are on file in the NRO.

Adjournment

The meeting was adjourned at 4:50 p.m.

F. Robert Naka
Secretary
NRP Executive Committee

* BYE-12983-71/1
w/B-12983-71 & atch

BYE-12983-71. July 15, 1971.
Subject: ExCom-M-26

Copy 1 Packard * #1
2-4 Helms via Duckett * on cy 2 #2
5 David via Martin * #3
6 Bennett (DIA)
7 Bowen (DASD/I)
8 Gayler (NSA)
9 Schlesinger via Sorrels (New EOB)
10 Foster (DDR&E)
11 SAFSP, Allen
12 Brownman (OSP)
13 Hartley
14 [redacted]
15 SS-7 * #4

Working Copies

McLucas * wc
SS-1
SS-3
SS-4
SS-5
SS-6
Naka (2) * wc (2)